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Abstract Climate change may well increase malaria morbidity and mortality. This would
slow economic growth through increased spending on health care, reduced production, and
less effective education. Slower economic growth would increase the incidence of malaria
morbidity and mortality. The integrated assessment model FUND is used to estimate the
strength of this negative feedback. Although climate-change-induced health problems may
well substantially affect the projected growth path of developing regions, it is unlikely that
climate change would reverse economic growth due to the impacts considered here. Even in
sub-Saharan Africa, an area thought to be very sensitive to climate change and associated
health effect, the impact, while detectable, is small and unlikely to reverse economic growth.
1 Introduction
Casual observation shows that hotter countries are generally poorer, despite some notable
exceptions like Kuwait and Singapore. The renewed attention of economics to growth,
income distribution and geography has led to the conclusion that hot implies poor, even
when controlling for all other known or suspected determinants of economic growth (e.g.,
Gallup et al. 1999; Masters and McMillan 2001). This finding has implications for climate
change, but one cannot simply transpose a spatial effect (hotter means poorer) to a temporal
effect (warming means slower growth), not without knowing the mechanisms behind the
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observed phenomenon (e.g., Schneider 1997). Unfortunately, the empirical literature on
climate and economic development is still inconclusive as to the mechanisms that relate
climate to economic growth. The possible exception to this is health.
Health risks are large in hot places, particularly if these places are wet as well (e.g.,
McMichael et al. 1996). Ill-health is an impediment to economic development, as labour
productivity and education efficacy are down. At the same time, poverty – and the
malnutrition, bad sanitation and deficient health care that come with it – implies ill-health
(e.g., Sachs and Malaney 2002). On the one hand, this explains the difficulty in
interpretation data and the problems with equating time and space. On the other hand, it
opens the possibility of a poverty trap (Azariadis 1996): one is ill because one is poor, and
one is poor because one is ill. Since global warming may well imply greater health risks,
global warming may deepen or widen poverty traps – keeping people in deeper poverty, or
keeping more people in poverty, or even reversing economic growth.
The prospect of climate-change-induced poverty is troubling in its own right. It increases
the negative impacts of climate change and its inequity at that (Fankhauser et al. 1997,
1998). It also violates some of the assumptions underlying climate change research,
particularly the separation between emission scenarios and climate change impacts
(Nakicenovic and Swart 2001; see also Fankhauser and Tol 2001). Furthermore, it
complicates the trade-off for many developing countries, as well as for donors of
development aid, between economic development and emission reduction (Schelling 1995).
For these reasons, the current paper investigates the possibility and the plausibility of
climate-change-induced poverty traps, using ill-health as the mechanism. Ill-health is here
restricted to malaria. Malaria is a major disease, taking more than a million lives each year.
Malaria is a disease that has clear and well-documented links with development as well as
with climate. This makes malaria an obvious starting point for an investigation like this; the
conclusions suggest that it should not be the end point.
Section 2 reviews the literature on the relationships between health, wealth and climate.
Section 3 present the basic model, FUND. Section 4 extends FUND to include the three-
way relationship between health, wealth and climate. The extended model expands on
current integrated assessments of health and climate (Chan et al. 1999; Martens 1996;
McMichael 1997). Section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Previous studies
Figure 1 shows the relationship between per capita income (PPP$, CIA 2002) and the
average annual temperature (according to the data of the Climate Research Unit; see New
et al. 1999). Although there are exceptions, hotter countries are generally poorer. Inter-
estingly, if one looks separately at the “rich” countries (income above $1,000) and the
“poor” countries, the effect almost disappears. This suggests that there is some income
threshold above which climate does not matter much, and some temperature threshold
above which it is simply too hot. A climate-induced poverty trap may explain this
observation. At high temperatures, all surpluses are devoted to defending against and
repairing the damages done by a tropical climate; no surplus is left for investing in growth.
At lower temperatures, surpluses exist and growth rapidly reduces vulnerabilities to
climate and weather. Bloom et al. (2001b) look deeper into this issue. They find that a
model with two equilibria explains the variations in income levels of countries; in the low
(high) equilibrium, a country is more (less) sensitive to climate; latitude (a proxy to climate)
also determines the probability of being in the high or low equilibrium. Unfortunately,
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Bloom et al. (2001b) did not test this hypothesis directly against other explanations of
income distribution across the world. At the same time, Fig. 1 demonstrates that there is no
simple relationship between temperature and income.1
Gallup et al. (1999) estimate the effect of climate on the level of GDP2 per capita as well
as its growth, controlling for standard explanations of development (e.g., economic capital,
human capital) but also geographic factors, mostly related to trade and transport costs.
Climate indicators include average temperature, fraction of land area in the tropics, and
malaria potential (in fact, a composite index of temperature and precipitation). They find
that hotter countries are poorer and grow slower, and speculate that health may be the
mechanism.
Masters and McMillan (2001) also find a significant influence of climate on economic
development, again controlling for other explanations for growth. However, they use the
number of frost days as climate indicator, arguing that frost kills pathogens for both humans
and crops.
On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2003) find that climate has only an indirect effect on
economic development, by determining the pattern of European colonisation and its
institutional legacies. Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) argue that institutions dominate
geography as explanation of economic development, and that the effect of climate is at best
indirect.
In sum, there are clear indications that climate affects the wealth of nations.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the mechanism or strength of this relationship.
The effect of health on wealth is well-established (e.g., Blackburn and Cipriani 2002).
Bloom et al. (2001a) survey 14 studies on the relationship between health and growth; 13 of
these 14 report a significant relationship. An increase in life expectancy stimulates growth.
1A similar conclusion would hold if one were to include other climate variables, such as precipitation.
2GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
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Fig. 1 Per capita income (2000) and annual average temperature (1961–1990) for almost all countries
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The estimates range from 0.13 to 0.75 additional annual economic growth for five
additional years of expected life-time. The model of Bhargava et al. (2000) is the only non-
linear one among the 14; they find that the effect of an increase in life expectancy is
stronger for poorer countries; in fact, the effect becomes insignificant for countries with an
average income above $7,000/year.
The effect of climate on health is also well-established (Dowlatabadi 1997; Haines and
Fuchs 1991; Haines and Parry 1993; McMichael et al. 1996; Patz and Martens 1997).
Martens et al. (1995, 1997), Martin and Lefebvre (1995), Matsuoka and Kai (1995) and
Morita et al. (1994) estimate the effects of climate change on the potential of malaria,
concluding that global warming would extend malaria risks in altitude and latitude. Tol
(2002a,b) combines the estimated changes in malaria potential of these studies with current
mortality and morbidity (according to Murray and Lopez 1996a,b), assuming that changes
in malaria incidence are proportional to changes in malaria potential.
The effect of wealth on health is undisputed, but not often quantified at the macro-scale.
Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) extend Tol (2002a,b) to include per capita income to explain
the difference between malaria potential and incidence. Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001)
estimate a linear relationship between per capita income and malaria incidence, and a
threshold income of $3,100/person/year above which malaria is absent.
In this paper, we further extend the malaria model to include the effect of malaria on
economic growth. In the model developed below, we include the effect of health on wealth
as well as the effect of wealth on health. This creates a negative feedback loop, which under
certain combinations of parameters and circumstances may lead to a poverty trap.
Furthermore, we introduce the effect of climate on health, so that we can study a potential
climate-change-induced poverty trap.
3 The model
The model used is version 2.6 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.6 of FUND is the same as version 1.6, described and
applied by Tol (1999a,b,c,d,e, 2001, 2002c), except for the impact module, which is
described by Tol (2002a,b) and updated by Tol (2002d) 3. A further difference is that the
current version of the model has 16 instead of nine regions. The current version also has
feedbacks from vector-borne diseases on economic development, a feature that was omitted
in previous versions of the model.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous
perturbations. The model is specified for 16 major world-regions: USA, Canada, Western
Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe,
former Soviet Union, Middle East, Central America, South America. South Asia, Southeast
Asia, China, North Africa, Subsaharan Africa, and Small Island States; see Table 2 in the
Appendix. The model runs from 1950 to 2200, in time steps of a year. The prime reason for
starting in 1950 is to initialise the climate change impact module. In FUND, climate
impacts are assumed to depend on the impact of the year before, to reflect the process of
adjustment to climate change. Because the starting values in 1950 cannot be approximated
very well, climate impacts (both physical and monetised) are misrepresented in the first few
decades. This would bias optimal control if the first decades of the simulation coincided
3More information and the source code of the model can be found at http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/
15/Sustainability/fund.html.
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with the first decades of emission abatement. Similarly, the twenty-second century is
included to provide the forward-looking agents in the twenty-first century with a long time
horizon. The calculated optimal emission reductions in 2100–2200 have little meaning (or
policy relevance) in and of themselves.
The IMAGE 4 database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994) is the basis for the calibration of the
model to the period 1950–2000. Scenarios for the period 2010–2100 are based on the
EMF145 Standardised Scenario, which lies between IS92a and IS92f (cf. Leggett et al.
1992). Note that the original EMF14 Standardised Scenario had to be adjusted to fit
FUND’s 16 regions and yearly time-step. The period 2000–2010 is a linear interpolation
between observations and the EMF14 Standardised Scenario.6 The period 2100–2200 is an
extrapolation of the EMF14 Standardised Scenario.
The scenarios concern the rate of population growth, economic growth, autonomous
energy efficiency improvements, the rate of decarbonization of the energy use (autonomous
carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change,
methane and nitrous oxide.
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climate
change. Population falls with climate change deaths, resulting from changes in heat stress,
cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to affect only
the elderly, non-reproductive population. The other sources of mortality do affect the
number of births. Heat stress only affects urban population. The share of urban in total
population is based on the World Resources Databases (WRI 2000); it is extrapolated with a
simple statistical relationship between urbanisation and per capita income, estimated from a
cross-section of countries in 1995. Population also changes with climate-induced migration
between the regions. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely
with the host population.
The tangible impacts of climate change are dead-weight losses to the economy.
Consumption and investment are reduced, without changing the saving’s rate. Climate
change thus reduces long-term economic growth, although at the short term consumption
takes a deeper cut. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide emission abatement.
The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply
autonomously decrease over time. This process can be sped up by abatement policies.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon
dioxide emission reductions on economy and emissions, and the impact of the damages of
climate change on the economy and the population.
Methane and nitrous oxide geometrically depleted from the atmosphere (cf. Schimel et al.
1996). The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide follows from a five-box model due
to Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987) in the parameterisation of Hammitt et al. (1992).
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are based on Shine et al.
(1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its
equilibrium (determined by radiative forcing RF), with a half-time of 50 years. Global mean
sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a
4IMAGE = Integrated Model for the Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect.
5EMF14 = Energy Modeling Forum, round 14.
6Note that, unfortunately, models such as FUND are hard to validate. Large parts of the model are entirely
scenario driven, and matching the data with the model would only demonstrate that the scenario parameters
were correctly chosen, not that the model is structurally correct. Other parts of the models, particularly on the
climate change impacts, do generate predictions, but here the data for validation are entirely missing.
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life-time of 50 years. Temperature and sea level are calibrated to the best guess temperature
and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996).
Note that the carbon cycle and climate module rely on older, partly outdated knowledge.
However, for the purposes of this paper, the above formulation suffices, as the focus is on
the interactions between malaria, development and climate – and not on carbon cycle,
radiative forcing, and climate.
The climate impact module is based on Tol (2002a,b). A limited number of categories
of the impact of climate change are considered: agriculture, forestry sea level rise,
cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue
fever, schistosomiasis, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems.
All impacts are monetised, and some impacts are expressed in money terms only. Impacts
are due to either the rate of change or the level of change. Damage in the rate of
temperature change slowly fades, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol 2002b). Some impacts
(incl. cardiovascular and respiratory diseases) explicitly recognise that there is a climate
optimum. A mix of factors determines the climate optimum. Impacts are positive or
negative depending on whether climate is moving to or away from that optimum climate.
Impacts are larger if the initial climate is further away from the optimum climate. The
optimum climate concerns the potential impacts. Actual impacts lag behind potential
impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to
the new climate are always negative (cf. Tol 2002b). Other impacts of climate change
(including malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis) are modelled as simple power
functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, but do not change sign (cf. Tol 2002b).
Vulnerability changes with population growth, economic growth, and technological
progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as heat-related
disorders (with urbanisation) and health (with higher values from higher per capita
incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as vector-borne
diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol 2002b).
Carbon dioxide emissions are calculated on the basis of the Kaya identity. Emission can
be modified by policy, e.g., through a carbon tax. The costs of emission reduction are
subject to learning by doing, so that emission abatement now reduces emission abatement
costs later. The exact specification is given by Tol (2002e). This paper is not considering
greenhouse gas emission reduction.
4 Modelling malaria
A vector-borne disease like malaria may intensify and spread with warmer and more humid
conditions. Currently disease-free areas, such as the highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya and
Indonesia (WHO 1990) as well as Australia, Southern Europe and the south of the USA
(Haines and Fuchs 1991), may be invaded. Although many studies refer to this effect in a
qualitative sense, only a few attempts to quantification have been reported.
Three model studies support the analysis here. Martin and Lefebvre (1995) indicate
under 2×CO2 an increase of 7–28%, depending on the GCM
7 used, in the land areas where
malaria can be potentially transmitted. Martens et al. (1995, 1997; cf. Martens 1997) expect
several millions of additional malaria cases by the year 2100. Morita et al. (1994) indicate a
10–30% increase in the number of people at risk from malaria under 2×CO2. Martens et al.
(1995, 1997) standardize their results to an increase in the global mean temperature of 1.16°C.
7GCM = General Circulation Model.
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Martin and Lefebvre (1995), and Morita et al. (1994), however, present their results (for
malaria only) for various increases in the global mean temperature (2.8–5.2°C). Both
studies suggest that the relationship between global warming and malaria is linear. For these
three studies, the GCM-specific estimates of the increase in global malaria death toll have
been scaled by the corresponding increase in the global mean temperature8 and then
averaged. Next, the averages of the three studies have been averaged. The yearly, regional
death toll due to malaria was taken from Murray and Lopez (1996a,b), expressed as fraction
of total population. Relative mortality is assumed to increase uniformly over the world.
Table 1, summarizes the findings for the 16 FUND regions.9
Vulnerability to vector-borne diseases strongly depends on basic health care and the
ability to purchase medicine. These factors are assumed to be linearly related to per capita
income. The data of the WHO (Murray and Lopez 1996a,b) suggest a linear relationship
between per capita income and mortality due to malaria, schistosomiasis, and dengue fever
for the Middle East, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia. Centrally Planned Asia
(too low mortality) and Africa (too high) mortality are outliers. A regression of vector-
borne mortality and per capita income suggests that populations with an income above
$3,100 per head, with a standard deviation of $260/head, are not vulnerable to vector-borne
diseases. Because of the outliers, the standard deviation is increased to $1000/head.
The model for malaria is thus:
mr;t ¼ arTbt
yc  yt;r
yc  y1990;r
 g
if yt;r  yc ð1Þ
while mt,r=0 if yt,r>yc; m denotes mortality; t denotes time; r denotes region; α is
parameter, the benchmark impact of climate change on malaria; cf. Table 1; y denotes per
capita income; T denotes the change in the global mean temperature relative to 1990; yc is a
parameter, denoting the per capita income at which vector-borne mortality becomes zero;
yc=$3,100 (2,100–4,100); β and γ are parameters, denoting the non-linearity of mortality
in temperature and income, respectively; α=1.0 (0.5–1.5); γ=1.0 (0.5–1.5).
The effect of malaria on economic growth is modelled as follows. As above, we only
consider the effect of a deviation of malaria from its (no-climate-change) baseline. Gallup
et al. (1999) estimate that malaria reduces economic growth in Africa, where most malaria
occurs, by up to 1% per annum. Murray and Lopez estimate that the maximum incidence of
malaria is 1.66 deaths per thousand per year. As Gallup et al. use a linear model, we thus
have that an additional malaria death per thousand reduces growth by 1/1.66=0.6%. This is
my best guess. Below, the results of a wide-ranging sensitivity analysis are reported.
The model now has a three-way interaction. Climate change increases malaria.
Economic growth reduces malaria, and malaria reduces economic growth. If the climate
change effect is strong enough, malaria will increase enough to reverse economic growth,
which in turn would lead to more malaria and less growth.
8Malaria is index to the global mean temperature, and formulated as a function of the global mean
temperature, despite the fact that precipitation is at least as important as is temperature. However, regions
differ quite considerably with regard to their projected precipitation changes, and GCMs disagree strongly.
Making malaria a function of both temperature and precipitation is not feasible with the crude geographical
resolution of the FUND model.
9Note that we assume conditions to be homogenous within each region. This is an obvious abstraction from
reality. Neither data nor available computational resources allow for a much finer resolution.
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5 Results
Figure 2 presents per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa for various strengths of the
effect of malaria on economic growth. Climate-change-induced malaria slows growth
perceptibly, but does not reverse growth, not even when the parameter is five times as large
as its best guess value (perhaps the maximum credible parameter value). Indeed, an analyt-
ically tractable approximation of the model suggests that the effect of malaria on economic
growth has to be at least 30 times as large as the best guess in order to reverse growth.
Figure 3 displays a sensitivity analysis around Fig. 2. Without the malaria effect, Sub-
Saharan incomes are projected to grow to some $17,000 per person per year. With the
malaria effect, and all parameters set at their best guesses, this value falls by about $700. If
malaria is more than linear in temperature (β=1.5 in Equation 13), income falls by some
$800. If malaria is less than linear in per capita income (γ=0.5 in Equation 13), income falls
by about $900. If the malaria feedback parameter is doubled, income falls by some $1,500.
A higher sensitivity of malaria to climate change (cf. Table 1) cuts income by about $1,600.
The largest effect, however, is due to the climate sensitivity; increasing this to 4.5°C for
2×CO2 leads to an income loss of about $3,800.
Figure 4 repeats Fig. 2, but now with the climate sensitivity set to its high value.
Figure 3 indicates that the climate sensitivity is the parameter with the greatest effect.
Without an impact of malaria on economic growth, per capita income reaches some
$14,000 per person per year in 2200. With the malaria effect of growth, per capita income
falls, but growth is not reversed. The maximum malaria effect reduces per capita income by
some $7,000 – in Fig. 2, this is only $3,000.
Table 1 Malaria mortality and morbidity and their sensitivity to global warming
Region Mortality Morbidity
Currenta Changeb Currentc Changed
USA 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
CAN 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
WEU 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
JPK 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
ANZ 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
EEU 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
FSU 0 0.0 (0.0) 0 0.0 (0.0)
MDE 14 2.1 (1.5) 350 5.2 (3.8)
CAM 32 2.8 (2.1) 140 1.3 (0.9)
SAM 32 7.4 (5.3) 140 3.4 (2.4)
SAS 31 27.5 (19.9) 500 45.0 (32.5)
SEA 113 40.0 (29.0) 370 13.1 (9.5)
CHI 0 0.0 (0.0) 40 4.1 (3.0)
NAF 14 1.3 (0.9) 350 3.2 (2.3)
SSA 1,435 591.4 (428.1) 5,300 218.5 (158.1)
SIS 32 1.1 (0.8) 140 0.5 (0.4)
a Deaths per million
b Thousand deaths per degree centigrade
c Years of life diseased per million people
d Thousand years of life diseased per degree centigrade
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Figure 5 repeats Figs. 2 and 4, but now baseline economic growth is much lower (and, in
fact, more consistent with the last 50 years of African development). In this case, climate-
change-induced malaria does reverse economic growth, but only if the parameter is set four
times as large as its best guess value.
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Fig. 3 Per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2200 under various parameter settings that govern the
effect of malaria on economic growth
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Fig. 2 Per capita income in Subsaharan Africa for various strengths of the effect of malaria on economic
growth. The parameter assumes values of, from top to bottom, 0.0 (no feedback), 0.6 (best guess), 1.2, 1.8,
2.4 and 3.0
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In sum, climate change may reverse economic growth through an increase in malaria.
However, this is only observed if climate change is rapid, economic growth is slow, and the
effect of ill-health on growth is large. Although this possibility cannot be excluded, one
would have to push parameters outside of their typical range to observe this effect.
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Fig. 5 Per capita income in Subsaharan Africa for various strengths of the effect of malaria on economic
growth. The parameter assumes values of, from top to bottom, 0.0 (no feedback), 0.6 (best guess), 1.2, 1.8,
2.4 and 3.0. The baseline economic growth is 1% per capita throughout the entire century; in Fig. 1,
economic growth is assumed to be 2.5% between 2010 and 2030, falling steadily to 1% in 2100
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Fig. 4 Per capita income in Subsaharan Africa for various strengths of the effect of malaria on economic
growth. The parameter assumes values of, from top to bottom, 0.0 (no feedback), 0.6 (best guess), 1.2, 1.8,
2.4 and 3.0. The climate sensitivity is an equilibrium warming of 4.5°C for a doubling of the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide; in Fig. 1, the climate sensitivity is 2.5°C
30 Climatic Change (2008) 88:21–34
6 Discussion and conclusion
The key question of this paper is whether climate change may reverse economic growth by
increasing the incidence of vector-borne diseases, particularly malaria. The preliminary
conclusion is that this is unlikely. Although the mechanism is in place in a qualitative sense,
quantitatively it is fairly weak. Only if parameters and scenarios deviate strongly from what
is commonly assumed can climate change induce a health-related poverty trap.
That said, the numerical results do indicate that the separation of greenhouse gas emission
scenarios from climate change impacts is misleading. Climate change may noticeably slow
economic growth, particularly in poorer regions. Although the combination of baseline
scenario and best guess parameters in this analysis shows only a 5% decline in per capita
income in 2100 in Subsaharan Africa due to climate change, other scenario and parameter
combinations show a larger change. The implication is that scenarios of population, income
and emissions cannot be developed without considering feedbacks of climate change.
Unlikely as a climate-change-induced health-poverty trap may seem at the spatial
resolution of the FUND model, the fact that there is small chance of something to happen
for the whole of Subsaharan Africa implies that there is a much larger probability of this
happening for a country or region. Particularly the sensitivity to baseline economic growth –
unlikely to be uniform over Africa – suggests that parts of Subsaharan Africa may face a
reversal of economic growth because of climate change.
The above findings are preliminary because the data are weak and our understanding is
incomplete. Furthermore, the model used misses several processes and details that may
crucially change the results. Public health in poor countries is an area of active intervention by
rich-world donors. A deterioration of the health situation, whether climate change induced or
not, may trigger an intensification of foreign aid, mitigating or even reversing the decline.
However, history shows that this is not automatic and that help is not always successful.
Malaria disproportionally affects the young. The effect of malaria on economic growth is
therefore primarily through education. The model includes neither age structure nor edu-
cation, implicitly keeping these the same as in the mid 1990s, the period for which the
model’s parameters were estimated and calibrated. However, one can imagine that a reduction
in economic growth would increase fertility rates. This would spread educational resources
more thinly, while the increased malaria risks would reduce the incentives to invest in edu-
cating vulnerable children. This would strengthen the negative feedback loop found above.
The analysis above ignores progress in medical technology. A cheap and reliable malaria
vaccine would remove all issues. However, it may also be that a gradual disappearance of
malaria would cut the market for malaria medicine and hence R&D, rendering the
remaining pockets of malaria more vulnerable.
Finally, there is more to health than malaria. Other diseases may increase as well with
climate change. A reduction in local food supply and a slowdown of economic growth and
hence the ability to import food would increase a population’s vulnerability to health
effects. The same holds true for water resources, where import substitution is more limited.
In sum, climate change may well, via deleterious health effects, slow economic growth.
The preliminary analysis in this paper suggests that climate change is unlikely to reverse
growth, but there are good reasons to believe that the results here are biased. Future
research should establish the strength of the biases, and the sign of the overall bias.
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Appendix
Table 2 The regions in FUND
Acronym Name Countries
USA USA USA
CAN Canada Canada
WEU Western Europe Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
JPK Japan and South
Korea
Japan, South Korea
ANZ Australia and New
Zealand
Australia, New Zealand
CEE Central and
Eastern Europe
Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Yugoslavia
FSU Former Soviet
Union
Armenia, Azarbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
MDE Middle East Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Unit Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen
CAM Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama
SAM South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuala
SAS South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
SEA Southeast Asia Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
CHI China plus China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Macau, Mongolia
NAF North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morroco, Tunisia, Western Sahara
SSA Subsaharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa,
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
SIS Small island states Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Comoros,
Cuba, Domenica, Domenican Republic, Fiji, French Polynesia, Grenada,
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands,
Martinique, Mauritius, Micronesia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New
Caledonia, Palau, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and
Grenadines, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Virgin Islands
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